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Multilateral cooperation  
behind the trade war headlines:  
How much trade is freed up?  




This paper highlights the importance of multilateral cooperation as an avenue for tackling technical 
barriers to trade (TBTs). These non-tariff barriers are some of the most prevalent affecting global 
trade. While the US-China trade war and its tariff escalation was grabbing headlines, multilateral 
cooperation was happening behind the scenes. The World Trade Organisation (WTO) TBT 
Committee has spent the past decade removing €80 billion worth of unnecessary trade costs 
affecting EU exports. This paper advocates the need for a renewed multilateral impetus in 
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US-China trade rivalry, and several other separate measures initiated by the Trump 
administration against other trading partners, including the EU, dominated newspaper 
headlines for several years. These escalating tit-for-tat trade measures resulted in new tariffs 
affecting over $300 billion of US imports, and many more billions of imports in third countries. 
These unprecedented measures were a reminder that tariffs can be very disruptive for global 
supply chains and consumers (see, for instance, Bown and Kolb, 2020). This may have led to 
the impression that unilateralism has taken over international trade relations at the expense of 
multilateralism. It may also have strengthened the conviction that tariffs are the most pervasive 
and detrimental barriers affecting global trade relations.  
The main aim of this paper is to challenge these views by offering some clear, quantitative 
estimates highlighting the importance of multilateral cooperation as an avenue for tackling 
TBTs. The WTO TBT Committee is the technical forum credited as being one of the most 
effective WTO committees in addressing trade concerns in a multilateral context. 
1. The importance of non-tariff barriers in a globalised economy 
The increasing economic liberalisation that has characterised the past few decades has also 
meant technical, behind-the-border trade barriers have become more important. These TBTs 
result from non-tariff measures (NTMs) – government regulations that affect exports and 
imports. For the most part, these are non-discriminatory and intended to preserve the safety 
and health of consumers or the environment. But although such regulations are usually 
perfectly legal and legitimate, compliance with differing requirements across countries might 
be complex and costly for companies seeking to export, particularly for small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs). 
Trade in the 21st century may face fewer traditional tariffs, but rules and regulations that affect 
international trade in goods and services have proliferated. These NTMs can be different in 
nature, but one important subset consists of those covered by multilateral disciplines under 
the WTO TBT Committee, including in terms of notification obligations. As can be seen from 
Figure 1, there has been a steady growth in the number of such TBT notifications over time, 
from around 500 per year in 1996 to over 3,000 per year since 2018. As a result, multilateral 
rules in the WTO and most regional and bilateral trade agreements (already implemented or 
under negotiation) include provisions on NTMs.  
The WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade provides one such multilateral forum. 
Regular WTO committee meetings are indispensable for the implementation of the TBT 
agreement and other WTO agreements. Here, delegations discuss issues pertinent to the 
operation of a particular agreement. Committee work helps to resolve trade tensions by 
diplomatic means and to achieve the same positive outcome in a less costly manner than 
through litigation. 
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Figure 1. Trends in TBT notifications under WTO TBT Committee procedures 
 
Source: authors’ composition based on WTO Technical Barriers to Trade Information Management System (http://tbtims.wto.org/).  
2. The systemic importance of the WTO TBT Committee as an enforcer 
Nowadays, with one of the main objectives for the new European Commission being to improve 
compliance and enforcement of trade rules, the proper enforcement and implementation of 
the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade is of utmost importance. The EU is one of 
the most active promoters of transparency and direct engagement with WTO trading partners 
in Geneva. It works to avoid unnecessary TBTs and the increased costs that EU exporters and 
importers face. ‘Specific trade concerns’ (STCs) are a very useful tool that can be utilised in the 
context of the WTO TBT Agreement. 
The nature of STC claims vary considerably. In some cases, concerned members simply seek 
further information and clarification of draft measures or require their notification. In other 
cases, and more seriously, the claims might be about violations of the rules of the TBT 
Agreement. Violations could include measures inconsistent with existing international 
standards or an unnecessary, hence disproportionate, level of trade restrictiveness. STC 
practice also contributes to the resolution of trade tensions, serving as a preventive mechanism 
against formal trade dispute. Over the years, the EU has succeeded in fully or partially 
addressing several trade barriers in an export market by taking decisive action at the TBT 
Committee. 
3. Can the WTO solve specific trade concerns (STCs)? 
The economic literature addressing the importance of TBT issues has a long record of relevant 
policy insights. A good overview is provided, for instance, in Maskus, Wilson and Otsuki (2000). 
The empirical literature, using mainly gravity modelling of trade, has developed along two 
strands. 
A first strand focuses on the benefits of developing a robust regulatory infrastructure. The 
increasing investment made by different countries, including the adoption of technical national 
standards in line with international standards, can encourage trade and facilitate development. 
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Several analyses examined the important transparency role of the WTO TBT Committee, based 
on the large number of notified TBTs to the WTO since 1995. These highlighted the successful 
inclusion of more and more countries, including developing and emerging ones, in TBT 
discussions and in the prevention of non-necessary regulations (see, for instance, Ghodsi, 
Grubler and Stehrer, 2016). Prévost (2013) conducted a legal analysis of the transparency 
obligations under the TBT Agreement, and concluded that these provisions provided valuable 
legal certainty for companies engaged in international trade.  
The question of whether the WTO has capacity to resolve trade concerns and to reduce conflicts 
is considered by two notification mechanisms: first, the obligation to notify TBT measures 
proposed; and, second, the possibility of notifying STCs against the proposed measure. This 
would trigger a dialogue at the early stage of the TBT implementation process, and therefore 
reduce the need for dispute settlement. Finally, all these transparency mechanisms, 
implemented at different regulatory stages, reduce the likelihood of emerging new barriers, thus 
leading to improved market access possibilities and a positive impact on trade flows. These 
conclusions are also found in various OECD analyses (see, for instance, OECD and WTO, 2019).  
The role of WTO notifications is equally important for developed and emerging economies. For 
instance, Ghosdi (2018) conducted a survey on the impact of Chinese TBTs on its manufacturing 
imports and found benefits of greater transparency whenever new technical norms were 
adopted in China. Ghosdi used a gravity model of Chinese manufactured imports at the HS6-
digit level during 2002-15. The results suggest a negative impact of tariffs and a positive impact 
of WTO notifications by China on the import values and quantities of manufacturing products 
from certain partners, especially those following international standards. This suggests that the 
introduction of new Chinese technical norms in line with international standards, and greater 
transparency via WTO notifications, had a trade-promoting effect. These results are in line with 
the results of Bao and Qiu (2010), who looked at aggregated imports at the 2-digit level for 
1998-2006, and found potential benefits of transparency on trade flows. This confirms that 
TBTs are not always de facto barriers to trade, and that in some cases they could be necessary 
and beneficial for trade partners. 
In contrast, a second strand of literature found that TBT measures could lead to legitimate trade 
concerns and significant increases in the cost of international trade. In many cases, such 
barriers lead to STCs raised in the WTO context. However, TBTs are sometimes introduced for 
valid public policy concerns and third country objections, and STCs are not always raised for 
legitimate reasons. Despite their generic name, not all TBTs notified at the WTO are trade 
barriers. As Ghodsi, Grubler and Stehrer (2016) empirically demonstrated, TBTs can be of three 
kinds: (i) neutral, with no discernible effect on trade; (ii) negative, with a negative effect on 
trade flows, and (iii) positive, i.e. technical measures that facilitate trade. Also, the literature 
underlined the differentiated impact that a TBT measure could have according to the level of 
economic development, type of measures, or type of firms.   
For each TBT category concerned, Fontagné and Orefice (2018) found a differentiated impact 
of TBT measures across firms. They show a crowding-out effect after the implementation of a 
TBT measure for less productive exporters, for the benefit of remaining companies. In addition, 
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multi-destination firms choose to reorient their exports toward markets where they are already 
present and compliant with norms and standards, or in certain cases choose to enter into new 
TBT-free markets instead of incurring the costs of complying with new TBT requirements. 
Finally, they found that stringent TBTs represent mainly an increase in fixed-trade costs that 
explain, in part, the differentiated impact across types of firms. These differentiated 
consequences could explain the multiple determinants of TBT and STC notifications. However, 
the nature of WTO STCs show a wide diversity of concerns: procedural application, short 
implementation timelines, discriminatory application, and divergence from international 
standards, etc. Therefore, not all STCs are the same.  
This brief literature review demonstrates that the trade effects of TBTs can be very complex, 
and influenced by many factors. However, showing that adopting international, high-quality 
standards and a sound regulatory infrastructure have trade-promoting effects clearly 
demonstrates the importance of multilateral cooperation, as promoted within the WTO TBT 
Committee. Many other studies confirmed the effectiveness of the WTO TBT Committee in 
resolving trade problems. Transparency and technical dialogue make it possible to find 
common ground and avoid recourse to dispute settlement. The creation of a single clearing 
house also makes it possible to centralise information, and conduct economic studies on the 
subject of TBTs that lead to informed policy making. However, beyond the determinants of STCs 
and the differentiated impact of existing TBTs on trade, a further question of interest from the 
EU perspective is to understand the economic benefits arising from notified barriers that were 
never implemented, i.e. estimating the value of trade flows that benefited from the prevention 
of new trade barriers through a successful resolution of STCs. 
4. Estimating the positive impact of STC resolution  
The WTO TBT Committee is a very active forum of discussion, with many WTO members raising 
specific trade concerns vis-à-vis measures planned by other members. The EU is among those 
most frequently engaged in such discussions. Of the hundreds of STCs raised by the EU over 
the years in the WTO TBT Committee meetings, a number of them were successful in 
addressing the concerns of EU exporters. Avoiding future TBTs in various third countries is 
certainly valuable and facilitates global trade, for EU and other WTO members.  
However, data and methodological constraints means that the value of such efforts is not 
always obvious. TBTs sometimes apply to a very specific product, while in other cases such 
measures can have a horizontal impact across many industrial sectors. Clearly identifying the 
specific products and trade affected by such TBTs is not straightforward, therefore, since the 
usual trade nomenclature (HS codes) do not match the classification of TBT measures.  
Despite such difficulties, we have managed in this paper to achieve a good match between TBTs 
and the products affected (see Box 1). According to DG TRADE estimates, based on the sectors 
and products that were subject to such TBT-related STCs measures, around €83 billion worth 
of EU exports were facilitated by successful interventions by the EU in the WTO TBT Committee 
over the past decade. Such measures affected a wide range of sectors (Figure 2), notably 
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medical devices, pharmaceuticals, automotive, food and beverages, IT products and electrical 
appliances, cosmetics, and other products (toys, textiles, ceramics, furniture, etc). 
Figure 2. The distribution of EU exports that benefited from successful interventions in 
removing TBT-related STCs in the WTO context 
 
Source: DG TRADE estimates, based on official Eurostat export statistics and the product scope of the STCs successfully 
addressed in the WTO TBT Committee during 2009-20. 
As shown in Figure 3, EU exports were particularly affected by TBT-related issues in several key 
countries including China, Russia, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Brazil, and South Korea. 
Thanks to the EU’s successful engagement and dialogue with the countries concerned during 
the WTO TBT Committee formal deliberations and in bilateral dialogues, a large number of such 
TBT-related barriers were removed or prevented before formal adoption. 
Figure 3. Geographical distribution of EU exports benefiting from the removal of TBT-related 
barriers (as % of total affected exports) 
 
Source: DG TRADE estimates, based on official Eurostat export statistics and the product scope of the STCs successfully 
addressed in the WTO TBT Committee during the 2009-20. 
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Box 1. Matching specific trade concerns (STCs) and HS codes of products 
This box explains the methodology used to determine products (identified using HS code 
classification) that potentially benefited from preventing new trade barriers by removing 
longstanding existing ones, or by providing clarity and certainty on the specific 
implementation of TBT-related measures by third countries.  
We examined 69 STCs on TBT issues raised by the EU that were successfully addressed in 
the WTO TBT Committee between 2009 and 2020. For each successful STC, we identified 
the product range that potentially benefited from the removal of the barrier, using the 
standard HS classification. 
The methodology relied on several elements. In certain cases, the products affected were 
identified with HS codes in the actual WTO TBT notifications provided by the countries 
imposing these measures. In other cases, the WTO notification contains information on 
the International Classification for Standards (ICS), which has a concordance table with HS 
product codes, provided by the WTO secretariat. In the remainder of the cases, when no 
such information is available, we complement our analysis with a detailed assessment by 
sectoral experts of the nature of the technical barrier and its product scope. 
For each STC, the most detailed HS codes that come closest to the product scope are 
chosen (i.e. whenever appropriate, we use HS-6 digits, otherwise we move up to the 
relevant HS-4, or in some limited cases (because of the horizontal nature of the barrier) 
we use HS-2 digit codes). Given the lack of harmonised cross-country trade statistics at 
more detailed level, we do not go further than HS-6 digits. 
Using this multi-pronged product identification method, we have managed to assign a total 
of 938 HS codes to the list of STCs successfully addressed by the EU in the WTO TBT 
Committee. As part of the data validation work, we removed 7 HS codes for which export 
data was not available for 2019. Because HS classification follows a nested structure (e.g. 
HS-2 digits codes contain HS-4 digits and HS-6 digits; HS-4 digits codes contain HS-6 digits) 
we used an algorithm to ensure that each individual HS6 code was included only once and 
to avoid duplication by the same products being counted twice during the period under 
investigation. Even if in reality one EU product exported to the same third country may 
have benefited from the removal of more than one TBT during the period covered, we 
have included that product only once.  
We acknowledge that, despite using multiple sources and combining different approaches, 
the product identification method used is not perfect. There are many difficulties in 
assigning technical regulations to products in such a large number of third countries, with 
different regulatory approaches and legislative systems. In a number of limited cases, it 
may well be that our method resulted in an overestimation of the value of trade affected. 
If trade data was missing, TBT cases were not included in the analysis. In other cases, 
whenever a clear choice was available between selecting a set of products leading to 
overestimation or underestimation, the latter option was adopted. Given that we have 
aggregated information on many STCs over a long period and involving a large number of 
countries and sectors, the limitations – and the small number of difficult cases – did not 
affect the overall reliability of our aggregate results. 
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5. The importance of data insights and stronger global coordination 
One of the main objectives of this paper was to bring to the fore the important technical work 
carried out in specialised WTO committees, and showcase its sheer economic importance. 
While the metrics offered here are descriptive and subject to certain caveats, the economic 
relevance of such TBT successes is undeniable. Another way to look at the trade value facilitated 
by such measures would be to consider the estimates available in the economic literature for 
the trade-creating effects of removing TBTs. For instance, Ghodsi, Grubler and Stehrer (2016) 
found that the average ‘tariff equivalent’ effect on trade from existing TBT STCs raised by all 
WTO members was between 9-19%, a far higher level than the actual tariffs applied by most 
WTO members on industrial products.  
Removing such STCs, therefore, is equivalent to removing a double-digit tariff on over €80 
billion worth of EU exports, which indicates a considerable potential increase in trade flows. 
This points once more to the need for more detailed analyses to support the regular committee 
work in promoting global trade. Such analyses should also take into account the impact of major 
regional and bilateral trade initiatives that can complement multilateral efforts (see, for 
instance, Pelkmans, 2020) as well as bilateral regulatory cooperation dialogues (Hu and 
Pelkmans, 2020). 
These successful cases, where TBTs against EU exporters were prevented, do not mean, 
however, that TBT problems do not persist. Often, the TBTs successfully prevented were part 
of a larger set of issues that continue to remain discriminatory or burdensome for international 
trade. Therefore, to be successful, EU exporters need to make substantial efforts to understand 
and comply with all trade formalities and regulations that apply to their products in third-
country markets. Even a decade ago, several analyses of such behind-the-border ‘murky 
protectionist’ measures that were scattered throughout all sorts of domestic regulations 
indicated that over €100 billion worth of EU exports were subject to unjustified restrictive 
measures abroad (Cernat and Madsen, 2011). It is perhaps telling that many key trading 
partners (China, Russia, India, etc.), where such behind-the-border protectionist measures 
were found most detrimental in 2011, continue to feature prominently in EU trade 
enforcement priorities today. 
Notwithstanding the many TBT problems that tend to persist for years, it is encouraging to see 
that new TBTs can also be avoided via multilateral cooperation. The EU supports these efforts 
by promoting transparency of rules, coherence of international regulations and standards, and 
mutual recognition in full respect of the right of governments to pursue their legitimate public 
policy objectives. A 2016 pan-European survey of EU exporters (European Commission, 2016) 
had already found that the most frequent and burdensome regulations for EU exporters are 
related to conformity assessments, testing procedures, and technical requirements (Figure 4). 
These measures include product certification and registration imposed by partner countries, 
labelling and marking requirements, as well as import procedures, certifications, technical 
standards and regulations on product characteristics. The high incidence of TBTs found in this 
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survey confirms findings of previous investigations and the widely perceived problematic 
nature of these measures.   
Figure 4. Incidence of non-tariff barriers reported by EU exporters, by main type 
 
Source: DG TRADE, based on https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/december/tradoc_155181.pdf. 
Against this background, it is important to acknowledge that the successful removal of TBT-
related STCs happened thanks to the engagement of other trading partners and the EU’s 
commitment to multilateral rules and their proper implementation. Although our 
quantification methodology could not capture the full trade effects beyond EU trade, it is 
equally important that the benefits stemming from resolving such STCs did not accrue only to 
EU exporters. In many cases, such TBT concerns were jointly raised with other WTO members. 
Trade facilitation effects were both de facto and de jure implemented vis-à-vis all WTO 
members, so even if not all WTO members associated themselves with such STCs, the trade 
benefits were multilateral in nature. To remain a driver of prosperity and sustainable 
development, global trade therefore needs such cooperation more than ever in the years to 
come. The appointment of the Chief Trade Enforcement Officer in DG TRADE is an important 
step in strengthening the EU's implementation and enforcement agenda, both multilaterally 
and bilaterally.    
In our post-Covid recovery efforts, it is particularly important to enforce existing rules and avoid 
new and costly technical barriers. The in-house analysis performed by the DG TRADE Chief 
Economist Team estimated a decrease in global trade of between 10-16% in 2020, which is line 
with the latest WTO trade forecasts. The predicted reduction is expected to be between 9-15% 
for extra-EU27 exports (European Commission, 2020). This drastic reduction in trade poses 
major risks to our post-Covid economic recovery, and any efforts to reduce unnecessary trade 
costs and barriers are of paramount importance. The renewed impetus on enforcement actions 
that help EU exporters to have access to key third-country markets builds on the valuable work 
already carried out as part of the long and painstaking committee work under the auspices of 
the WTO. The EU has already tabled several proposals to improve the functioning of the WTO 
system (European Commission, 2018). 2021 provides a window of opportunity to strengthen 
the multilateral system, including by strengthening the technical committee work that happens 
behind the headlines.  
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